This study, based on 273 face-to-face interviews with students, scholars, and former residents of China in the United States in 1993, uses both qualitative and quantitative methods to explain people's views about returning to China. Although less than 9 percent of interviewees had concrete plans to return, over 32 percent were positively disposed to returning in the future. Key background variables that affect that decision are people's age, sex, social background in China, and their views about returning when they first left China. Concern about children's future was not significant, but having a wife abroad greatly increased the desire to stay abroad. Why people chose not to return varied significantly between people with children and those who didn't. Even four years after the Tiananmen crackdown, concerns about political instability, lack of political freedom, and a lack of trust that the government would let people who returned leave again were significant reasons for not returning. But economic factors--better U.S. housing and incomes--as well as professional concerns about lack of job or career mobility in China and a poor work environment there were equally important. Given the weight attributed to economic factors and political stability, if China weathers Deng Xiaoping's succession and the economy continues to grow, significant numbers of Chinese may return.
Introduction

B
eginning in the 1970s, China's leaders made a strategic decision to send Chinese scholars overseas for academic and scientific training. The goal was to compensate for the years lost through the Cultural Revolution by training a new generation (or retraining an older generation) of researchers and teachers and through these exchanges to catapult China into the top ranks of the global scientific community.
It was easy to find Chinese scholars interested in going abroad; the trick was to get them to return. In the early years of the open policy in education, China's return rate was quite high. Sending primarily advanced or mature scholars, with established careers and families in China, universities and research labs gained extraordinary benefits from these educational exchanges (Lampton 1986; Chen and Zweig 1993) . But as the 1980s wore on, the ranks of returnees dwindled. The military assault on Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, transformed the "brain drain" into a veritable avalanche. Many Western governments, responding to howls of protest by mainland Chinese in their midst and their own citizens of Chinese extraction, allowed Chinese students and scholars to extend their stays. Over 50,000 Chinese students and scholars became permanent residents of the United States; over 10,000 secured working fights in Canada; and in Australia, over 20,000 Chinese students were accorded an opportunity to stay, although the longevity of that commitment is in some doubt.
As the political fallout of June 4 recedes and the post-Deng era approaches, are Chinese students and scholars planning to return, and if so, in what numbers? What motivates people to stay or return--politics, economics, personal development, or family factors? If it is economics, then more immediate changes, such as the current economic boom in China, could increase the return rate; if people's primary concerns are political instability and the lack of freedom, then economic growth without political liberalization or stability will attract fewer returnees. Using bivariate and multivariate analysis, and based on interviews with 273 Chinese students, scholars, and professionals in the workplace conducted in 1993 in several American cities, this paper seeks to explain people's views about returning, focusing specifically on four key variables: economics, politics, family, and career opportunities. The study also assesses the role of background variables such as sex, visa type, age, and social background on the decision to return or not to return to China.
Explaining the Brain Drain
Cross-national Surveys
Cross-national studies have found a set of relatively consistent factors that "push" people out of their homeland and "pull" them into the developed world (Otieza 1968) . Most studies see the low level of economic and political development in the Third World "pushing" academics and other professionals out, while the resources
